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Recap; Freedom from Religion Foundation v: Weber: Big Mountain 
Jesus and the Constitution  
Constance Van Kley  
No. 13-35770 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
Oral Argument: Tuesday, July 7, 2015, in Pioneer Courtroom, 2nd Floor, 
Portland, Oregon. Heard by Judges Harry Pregerson, N. Randy Smith, 
and John Byron Owens. 
 
I. RICH BOLTON FOR APPELLANT FREEDOM FROM RELIGION 
FOUNDATION 
 
Mr. Bolton presented his argument defensively and without a 
clear structure. The Judges, particularly Judge Smith, vigorously 
questioned him. Their questions primarily focused on establishing 
whether a factual dispute exists and determining FFRF’s legal arguments 
on both standing and the constitutional issues presented.  
Mr. Bolton opened by reminding the Court that Big Mountain 
Jesus has historically been considered a religious shrine. The Knights of 
Columbus (“KOC”), not the United States Forest Service (“USFS”), 
owns the statue. The Appellant’s position is that USFS violated the 
Establishment Clause by issuing a permit reauthorizing the placement of 
the KOC-owned Jesus statue on USFS land. The Freedom from Religion 
Foundation (“FFRF”) does not dispute that USFS followed current 
regulations in reissuing the permit. Rather, it asserts that USFS showed 
prejudice in the permit renewal process and that the result of 
reissuance—the continued existence of the statue on government land—
violates the Establishment Clause. 
In response to Judge Smith’s questions, Mr. Bolton moved to 
FFRF’s standing to sue under the Establishment Clause. FFRF bases 
standing on member Pamela Morris, who saw the statue in 1957 and has 
since avoided the area. Judge Smith questioned why Ms. Morris would 
need to avoid the statue when the record suggests that she would 
encounter it only if she were specifically looking for it. Mr. Bolton 
presented two arguments: first, that Ms. Morris’s declaration of 
avoidance is sufficient; and second, that some facts in the record suggest 
that the statue is actually “readily viewable.” As an alternative basis for 
standing, Mr. Bolton pointed to William Cox, who encounters the statue 
several times each year. In response to Judge Smith, who suggested that 
Mr. Cox’s dislike of the statue did not suggest religious injury, Mr. 
Bolton argued that any unwanted exposure to displays of religious 
endorsement on state property does in fact give standing. Although Mr. 
Cox did not become an FFRF member until after initiation of the lawsuit, 
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Mr. Bolton asserted that he may rightfully be considered a member for 
the purpose of standing.  
Mr. Bolton moved then to the merits of the case, framing the 
issue as whether permit reissuance violates the Establishment Clause. 
Mr. Bolton advocated for application of the standard articulated in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman,1 which prohibits the government’s endorsement of 
religion. Because the exception to Lemon set forth in Van Orden v. 
Perry2 is properly applied only in a museum-like context, it does not 
apply here, as the Jesus statue is the only monument on Big Mountain. 
The ultimate question, then, is whether the statue is a government 
endorsement of religious speech. 
Judge Smith asked Mr. Bolton to distinguish Capitol Square 
Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,3 a Free Speech Clause case that 
authorizes governmental entities to neutrally allow private speech in a 
public forum. Mr. Bolton argued that Capitol Square did not deal with a 
permanent monument, and USFS lands were never designated as a forum 
for discourse. Even if the forest were a limited public forum, permanent 
religious monuments such as the Jesus statue are unconstitutional. 
Although the current permit will expire, the statue may be considered a 
permanent monument because the current regulations present no obstacle 
to reissuance. Mr. Bolton argued that the point is moot regardless: the 
Establishment Clause takes precedence over the Free Speech Clause in a 
limited public forum analysis. 
 To close, Mr. Bolton returned to the issue as originally stated: 
does the statue give the appearance of government endorsement? 
Because questions of fact remain on this issue, summary judgment was 
inappropriate. The statue’s original classification as a religious shrine 
may show religious endorsement. Additionally, the government initially 
denied reauthorization and reissued the permit only in response to public 
outcry, suggesting that the renewal was a product of a process 
susceptible to religious favoritism. For legal support, Mr. Bolton pointed 
to Trunk v. City of San Diego,4 in which the Ninth Circuit found that a 
stand-alone cross gave the appearance of religious endorsement even 
though it was recognized and commissioned as a war memorial. The 
incongruous nature of the Jesus statue in picturesque surroundings 
similarly gives rise to contemplation, enhancing the appearance of 
religious endorsement. 
 
                                           
1 400 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). Under Lemon, an inquiry into a potential violation of the Establishment 
Clause considers purpose, effect, and whether the government action fosters “an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.” 
2 125 U.S. 677, 702 (2005) (Breyer, J. concurring). In his concurrence Justice Breyer suggests 
applying three primary considerations in difficult Establishment Clause cases: use, setting, and 
history. 
3 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
4 629 F.3d 1099. 
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II. JOAN PEPIN FOR APPELLEE UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE 
 
To structure her argument, Ms. Pepin applied both the Lemon 
test and the Van Orden exception to show that the USFS’s authorization 
of the statue was constitutional by any standard. The Judges asked few 
legal questions of Ms. Pepin, focusing primarily on whether a material 
factual issue remained. The Court seemed to closely follow her legal 
argument, which was well-organized and cohesive. 
Ms. Pepin argued that under the Lemon test, the government 
must only show that it is motivated in part by a secular purpose. The 
government had two secular purposes supporting permit reissuance: first, 
the statue had local historical significance; and second, USFS did its duty 
in following regulations. 
Ms. Pepin disputed FFRF’s argument that USFS created a 
secular purpose in an attempt to hide the statue’s clear religious purpose. 
Big Mountain Jesus is a religious symbol, but it has secular value as a 
beloved, quirky, and relatively rare reminder of the area’s early 
development. Ms. Pepin argued that FFRF can present no facts 
discrediting the statue’s historical significance but only speculate that 
reissuance of the permit is a sham. 
Ms. Pepin turned to whether the statue gives the effect of 
religious endorsement. The test for endorsement is applied not to the 
statue itself, which is KOC’s private speech, but to the government’s 
action in reissuing the permit. Under Capitol Square, FFRF must show 
the government discriminated in favor of private religious expression or 
activity.5 Here, there is no support for a finding that USFS discriminated 
in favor of religious users when USFS appropriately followed neutral 
regulations.  
Endorsement is a legal rather than a factual determination. As 
the plaintiff and appellant, FFRF bears the burden of showing 
discrimination. Ms. Pepin argued that summary judgment was 
appropriate because the facts as stated by FFRF cannot lead to a 
reasonable inference in favor of endorsement. Ms. Pepin systematically 
discredited FFRF’s interpretation of the record, using the facts to show 
that USFS simply followed neutral regulations in reissuing the permit, 
treating KOC as it would any other applicant.  
Finally, Ms. Pepin analyzed the statue under the Van Orden 
exception to the Lemon test. Under Van Orden, a court considers use, 
setting, and history. Here, the use is somewhat mixed but primarily 
secular: Big Mountain Jesus is “usually wearing a ski helmet,” and skiers 
find the statue a convenient and quirky meeting-place. The setting, too, is 
secular: Big Mountain is a commercial ski area; nothing encourages 
worship or devotion. Finally, the history suggests religious neutrality, as 
                                           
5 Capital Square, 515 U.S. at 764. 
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the statue stood for fifty-seven years before its first challenge, when the 
Appellant first sent letters to USFS and filed FOIA requests. 
 
III. ERIC BAXTER FOR APPELLEE KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS 
 
Mr. Baxter’s argument centered on distinguishing and 
analogizing a range of Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court cases. Mr. 
Baxter framed the test of the Establishment Clause differently than either 
other party: to prevail, a person must have felt excluded on the grounds 
of religious belief. 
His argument focused not on the Establishment Clause, however, 
but on the Free Speech Clause, which had not factored into the District 
Court’s decision to grant summary judgment. If the Free Speech Clause 
authorizes the statue, KOC might not merely survive this challenge but 
enjoy considerable protection from future constitutional challenges. The 
Judges’ questions for Mr. Baxter were designed to further clarify 
precedent and to establish that a factual issue did not exist. 
Mr. Baxter opened by expanding on the statue’s context. Big 
Mountain Jesus can be viewed only by travelling to a commercial ski 
resort, paying to ski, riding a lift to the top of the mountain, choosing one 
particular run on the very edge of the resort, and then looking to the left 
through a stand of trees at the right moment. A skier who stops will find 
a sign commemorating the lives of fallen WWII soldiers and designating 
the Knights of Columbus as the statue’s owner.   
Mr. Baxter looked to Christian Science Reading Room Jointly 
Maintained v. City and County of San Francisco,6 where the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed a potential Establishment Clause 
violation within the context of a commercial airport. In a commercial 
context, the government likely does not endorse religion by allowing 
private religious speech. The statue’s presence on Big Mountain creates 
the assumption that it belongs to the resort, not the government. 
Mr. Baxter expanded the discussion of private speech in a public 
forum, which is expressly allowed under the Free Speech Clause. The 
entirety of the National Forest is a public forum; KOC’s speech is private 
speech; and to target that speech contrary to regulations would be to 
discriminate against that private speech in violation of the Free Speech 
Clause. Mr. Baxter distinguished Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. 
Summum,7 where the Supreme Court analyzed a permanent government-
owned monument in a public forum under the Establishment rather than 
the Free Speech clause. Because Big Mountain Jesus is privately owned, 
the proper analysis proceeds under the Free Speech Clause.  
                                           
6 784 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1986). 
7 555 U.S. 460 (2009 
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Mr. Baxter distinguished Trunk, upon which FFRF relies 
heavily. Trunk involved a 43-foot-tall cross, viewable from the interstate, 
with a strong history of religious use. Mr. Baxter suggested that the facts 
in Trunk were extreme, characterizing Trunk as the exception to the 
general rule that monuments stand. Mr. Baxter closed by reinforcing 
KOC’s argument that revoking the permit would constitute 
unconstitutional discrimination. 
 
IV. BOLTON’S REBUTTAL 
 
Although Mr. Bolton had already exceeded his time limit, the 
Court allowed time for rebuttal. Mr. Bolton attempted to redraw the 
issue: the proper question is whether the statue gives the appearance of 
religious endorsement, not—as the government argues—whether 
authorization of the statue gives evidence of discrimination. Regardless 
of how the issue is framed, however, facts on record support FFRF’s 
position. Mr. Bolton argued that summary judgment was inappropriate 




Framing the issues may prove more difficult than reaching a 
holding. Each party presented a different standard for determining 
whether the Establishment Clause is violated by the permit’s reissuance. 
FFRF argued that the standard is whether the statue’s presence on 
government land gives the appearance of government endorsement of 
religion. USFS argued both that analysis should proceed under Lemon 
and/or Van Orden and that FFRF must prove not only the appearance of 
endorsement but actual government discrimination. KOC suggested that 
the proper standard is a person’s sense of exclusion based on religious 
beliefs. Further, KOC brought an additional constitutional issue: whether 
revoking the permit would violate the Free Speech Clause by 
discriminating against KOC’s private speech. 
It is unlikely that remanding for further proceedings would 
clarify legal issues: FFRF did not point to specific facts suggesting a 
material factual dispute, and USFS rightly characterized FFRF’s attempt 
to do so as speculative. The Court will likely find that the only remaining 
questions are questions of law. 
Mr. Baxter presented the free speech issue well, but the Court 
will likely find that the primary inquiry proceeds under the Establishment 
Clause. The action complained of, the government’s reissuing a permit, 
is an act of government and not private speech. The Court will only need 
to reach the free speech issue if it finds that the Establishment Clause 
was violated and that FFRF lacked standing to bring the claim. 
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The Court may find that FFRF lacked standing to sue. FFRF 
cited to the facts on record to support its argument for standing, but it did 
not present a cohesive legal argument on this point. The Court’s decision 
to question the Appellant but neither of the Appellees on standing 
suggests that it had already reached a decision on the issue. If the Court 
decides FFRF lacks standing, it need not consider whether the District 
Court correctly analyzed the Establishment Clause issue, but it may 
choose to do so to provide clarification and prevent later reversal. 
If the Court reaches the Establishment Clause issue, the Appellee 
USFS presented the likeliest framework for the Court’s decision. USFS’s 
argument is consistent with the District Court’s analysis, and it is simple, 
cohesive, and supported by United States Supreme Court and Ninth 
Circuit precedent. Even if the Court adopts the Appellant’s strict 
standard for analysis under the Establishment Clause, however, it will 
likely affirm summary judgment, finding that the context of the statue 
prevents the appearance of government endorsement. The Court will 
likely affirm summary judgment on either the basis of standing or lack of 
violation of the Establishment Clause.  
